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From the Mouths of Babes: Does the Constitutional 
Right of Privacy Mandate a Parent-Child 
Privilege? 
On the evening of March 26, 1977, several hundred students 
were attending a dance held in the first floor cafeteria area of the 
Canisuis College student center in Buffalo, New York. During the 
dance the auditorium on the second floor was somehow set 
ablaze. Suspecting arson, the local district attorney convened a 
grand jury to conduct an investigation. The testimony elicited 
from several witnesses conclusively placed "John Doe, " a sixteen- 
year-old, near the auditorium a t  the time of the fire. Cognizant 
that a juvenile may not constitutionally be forced to incriminate 
himself,' the district attorney devised an ingenious, if not ingen- 
uous, strategy to secure the juvenile's admission of the crime.l He 
issued subpoenas to John's parents, seeking testimonial evidence 
in the form of admissions John may have made to his parents 
concerning the fire. Neither parent was in the vicinity of the 
student center a t  the time the alleged arson occurred and thus 
neither parent had personal knowledge concerning the incident. . 
A motion brought by John's parents to quash the subpoenas was 
granted and the district attorney appealed. Hence, the question 
before the court in People v. Doe3 was whether a parent whose 
minor child had come to him in the privacy of the home seeking 
guidance and counsel could be compelled to divulge the sub- 
stance of the potentially incriminating communication. 
Of all the relationships that comprise our social fabric, the 
most important exist within the familial ~ o n t e x t . ~  Hence, it is not 
surprising to find that nearly every state recognizes by statute or 
case law an evidentiary privilege that, to one degree or another, 
1. See In re Gault, 387 US.  1 (1967). 
2. See Coburn, Child-Parent Communications: Spare the Privilege and Spoil the 
Child, 74 DICK. L. REV. 599, 600 (1970) (footnotes omitted): 
In Gault, the Court held that a juvenile has a privilege against self- 
incrimination in the fact-finding phase of the juvenile delinquency hearing. A 
court, by compelling the juvenile's parent to testify concerning matters which 
the juvenile could not be forced to divulge, indirectly causes the juvenile to 
incriminate himself solely because of a natural, but regrettably mistaken, belief 
on his part that his conversations with his parents are private. Such surrepti- 
tious judicial practices should be proscribed. 
3. 61 A.D.2d 426, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1978). 
4. See Levy, The Rights of Parents, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 693, 693. 
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operates to exclude from judicial consideration confidential com- 
munications between husband and wife? What is surprising is 
that not a single jurisdiction recognizes an evidentiary privilege 
affording such deference to parent-child communications.6 
This Comment will consider the question of whether commu- 
nications between parents and their minor children should, in 
whole or in part, be beyond the reach of legal process. First, it will 
explore in depth the nature and rationale of evidentiary privileges 
with respect to parent-child communications in an attempt to 
determine whether the protection of communications between 
parent and child would accord with the generally accepted ration- 
ales underpinning the presently recognized privileges. Second, 
the concept of family integrity and privacy will be outlined in the 
light of both common law and constitutional interpretation, 
which together have created a protective panoply surrounding 
many aspects of family life. Whether the protections th'at inhere 
in family privacy include a protection for parent-child communi- 
cations will then be analyzed. Finally, and perhaps most impor- 
tantly, this Comment will attempt to define and delimit the con- 
fines of such a privilege, suggesting guidelines courts and legisla- 
tures may consider in dealing with parent-child communications. 
A. Introduction 
The word "privilege" is derived from the Latin phrase 
"privata lex," meaning a private law applicable to a small group 
of persons as their special prerogative.' Before a meaningful anal- 
ysis of evidentiary privileges may be entertained, the law govern- 
ing privileges must be extracted from the rules of evidence. Rules 
of evidence preventing the introduction of probative facts may 
generally be classed in two groups: rules of exclusion and rules of 
privilege? Rules of exclusion serve either of two functions. Cer- 
tain rules of exclusion attempt to maintain the integrity of the 
factfinding process by barring the introduction of probative mate- 
rial that by its nature is unreliable or untrustworthy. Examples 
- - - - 
5. See note 43 infra. 
6. See 3 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE $ 578 (13th ed. 1973). 
7. Slovenko, Psychiatry and a Second Look at the Medical Privilege, 6 WAYNE L. REV. 
175, 181 (1960). 
8. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE $ 72 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as 
MCCORMICK]; Barnhart, Theory of Testimonial Competency and Privilege, 4 ARK. L. REV. 
378, 378-79 (1950); McCormick, The Scope of Privilege in the Law of Evidence, 16 TEX. 
L. REV. 447, 447-48 (1938). 
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of these rules include "the hearsay rule, the opinion rule, the rule 
rejecting proof of bad character as evidence of crime, and the rule 
excluding secondary evidence until the original document is 
shown to be ~navai lable ."~ Other exclusionary rules keep out 
"irrelevant or immaterial matter which would prove nothing, 
waste time, and sometimes actually harm the opponent by im- 
properly calling attention to things about the opponent or his case 
which might arouse prejudice or ill will against him in the minds 
of the jury."1° 
The practical effect of the evidentiary privilege is the same 
as any of the exclusionary rules-it excepts certain classes of 
evidence from judicial consideration. However, its rationale is 
much different. The exclusionary rules actually facilitate the pro- 
per ascertainment of truth by excluding evidence that may be 
misleading, prejudicial, or untrustworthy.ll Privileges, on the 
other hand, are not an aid to the discovery of truth. They in fact 
impair and often completely stifle the factfinding process.12 
"Their sole warrant is the protection of interests and relation- 
ships which, rightly or wrongly, are regarded as of sufficient social 
importance to justify some incidental sacrifice of sources of facts 
needed in the administration of justice."13 
The rules of privilege may conveniently be categorized into 
three groups.14 The first class of privileges consists of those de- 
voted to the protection of the rights of the individual, such as the 
privilege against self-incrimination and the exclusionary rule 
which proscribes the introduction of illegally obtained evidence? 
9. MCCORMICK, supra note 8, 8 72, a t  151. 
10. Barnhart, supra note 8, a t  377. 
11. See MCCORMICK, supra note 8, 8 72, at 152; Barnhart, supra note 8, at 377; 
McCormick, supra note 8, a t  447. 
12. See 8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE 8 2192, a t  72-73 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) 
[hereinafter cited as WIGMORE]; Barnhart, supra note 8, a t  377-78. 
13. McCormick, supra note 8, a t  447-48 (footnote omitted). See also Fisher, The 
Psychotherapeutic Professions and the Law of Privileged Communications, 10 WAYNE L. 
REV. 609, 609-10 (1964). 
14. Coburn, supra note 2, a t  602; Fisher, supra note 13, a t  610. 
15. The exclusionary rule, a t  first blush, is seemingly what its name implies: a rule 
of exclusion. On closer analysis, however, it is clear that the exclusionary rule is in fact a 
privilege. Professor McCormick made the following observation: 
Manifestly, however, the mle allowing the objection is not designed to protect 
the parties against unreliable evidence. Quite the contrary. The constitution- 
makers looked back to the protection of the person, the home, and the owner's 
effects, against unreasonable official interference. If the court rejects the evi- 
dence, i t  is not because it would shed false light on the issues, but only because 
its exclusion may serve to discourage future unlawful seizures and raids. The 
objection, then, seems properly classed as a claim of privilege. 
McCormick, supra note 8, a t  450-51 (footnote omitted). 
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The second group of privileges is designed to maintain the 
"integrity of the system of government"%nd includes the privi- 
lege accorded the government against the disclosure of inform- 
ants,17 the privilege afforded judges and jurors, and the privilege 
that accompanies government secrets.18 The third class is com- 
posed of "privileges designed to be 'a significant expression of the 
law's concern or regard for the security of the individual as a 
participant in relationships which the state considers it impor- 
tant to foster and protect and, it  should be added, for the security 
and sanctity of the relationship itself.' "I9 The ambit of this class 
of privileges circumscribes those privileges protecting the confi- 
dential communications of parties to certain relationships. 
Since parent-child communications approximate many al- 
ready privileged communications, a comparison of the nature and 
context of the parent-child relationship with the nature and con- 
text of other privileged relationships will afford an opportunity to 
determine whether a parent-child privilege should be recognized. 
In addition, it will also provide a framework within which the 
scope of the privilege may be ascertained if it is ultimately deter- 
mined to merit recognition. 
B. The History and Rationale of the Major Relational Privileges 
At Roman law there was a form of the attorney-client privi- 
lege." Whether the Roman tradition influenced the development 
of the privilege at common law is unknown,22 but by the reign of 
Elizabeth I the privilege was firmly en t r en~hed .~~  At common law 
the attorney-client privilege was recognized because of the law- 
yer's status as a gentleman.24 The courts in that day recognized 
the prerogative of a gentleman not to violate a pledge of secrecy. 
16. Fisher, supra note 13, at 610. 
17. See generally MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 111: 8 WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2374; 
71 DICK. L. REV. 366 (1967). 
18. See generally MCCORMICK, supra note 8, §§ 106-113. 
19. Coburn, supra note 2, at 602-03 (quoting Smith, Reintegrating Our Concepts of 
Privileged Communicants, 16 SOC. SEW. REV. 191, 193 (1942)). 
20. See generally MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 87; 8 WICMORE, supra note 12, 54  2290- 
2291; Sedler & Simeone, The Realities of Attorney-Client Confidences, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1 (1963); Comment, Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its 
lmplications for the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226 (1962). 
21. Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communication Between Lawyer and 
Client, 16 CALIF. L. REV. 487, 488 (1928). 
22. Id. at 489. 
23. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2290, at 543. 
24. Id.; Radin, supra note 21, at 487. 
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The privilege accorded gentlemen gradually eroded due to judi- 
cial views that the need for truth overshadowed the importance 
of a gentleman's honor.25 The lawyer, however, was able to retain 
the exemption as the rationale supporting the privilege under- 
went a significant change. Rather than being a consideration for 
the oath and honor of the attorney,*' the new rationale became 
"the necessity of providing subjectively for the client's freedom 
of apprehension in consulting his legal adviser."27 Today, the 
privilege is recognized in every state." 
Early common law prevented interested parties from testify- 
ing in their own causes.30 It was also believed that the husband 
and wife were a single entity before the law.31 The logical conse- 
quence of these two propositions was that a person became wholly 
incompetent to testify in any action either for or against his 
spouse .32 "Contemporanous with, and perhaps pre-existing the 
incompetency"" rule, some courts held that a witness could tes- 
tify in his spouse's behalf, but the party-spouse could prevent the 
other from testifying against him.34 This has been called the 
"privilege for anti-marital facts."35 The disqualification of hus- 
bands and wives was abolished by statute in England in 185336 
and was replaced by a rule that sought to prevent disclosure of 
communications between husband and wife.37 The general dispo- 
sition of the legislatures and courts in the United States has been 
25. MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 87, a t  175. 
26. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2290, a t  543. 
27. Id. at  543 (emphasis in original). 
28. Comment, Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its 
Implications for the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226, 1227 & n.7 
( 1962). 
29. See generally MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 78; 8 WIGMORE, supra note 12, $ 4  2227- 
2228, 2332-2333; The Husband-Wife Privileges of Testimonial Non-Disclosure, 56 Nw. 
U.L. REV. 208 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Husband- Wife Privileges]. 
30. Husband- Wife Privileges, supra note 29, a t  208; Note, Competency of One Spouse 
to Testify Against the Other in Criminal Cases Where the Testimony Does Not Relate to 
Confidential Communications: Modern Trend, 38 VA.  L. REV. 359, 359 (1952) [hereinafter 
cited as Confidential Communications]. 
31. Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence: Family 
Relations, 13 MINN. L. REV. 675, 675 (1929); Husband- Wife Privileges, supra note 29, at  
208; Confidential Communications, supra note 30, a t  359. 
32. Husband- Wife Privileges, supra note 29, a t  208; Confidental Communications, 
supra note 30, at  359. See Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 31, a t  675. 
33. Husband- Wife Privileges, supra note 29, at  209 (footnote omitted). 
34. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2227, a t  211 & n.1. 
35. Id. 
36. MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 78, a t  161. 
37. Id. 
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to follow the privileged communications rule, although some ju- 
risdictions adhere to both the antimarital facts rule and and the 
privileged communications rule.38 
The marital communications privilege is the natural conse- 
quence of a belief that marital commnications must be protected 
to maintain the harmony, confidentiality, and freedom of com- 
munication necessary to the proper functioning of the relati~n.~' 
This rationale for the privilege is not universally accepted, how- 
ever." The other rationale generally advanced'in support of the 
privilege is that forcing one spouse to disclose the contents of 
confidential communications is so repugnant that it is judicially 
n~npalatable.~' This putative justification for the existence of the 
privilege also has its detractors." Whether these suggested ration- 
ales truly justify the existence of the privilege is largely a matter 
of academic debate in view of the fact that adherence to the 
privilege is nearly universal.43 
Once the pledge of secrecy afforded gentlemen was no longer 
recognized in the English courts, any deference that may have 
been accorded the physician-patient relationship by the common 
38. See Husband- Wife Privileges, supra note 29, a t  218 & n.50. 
39. See Husband-Wife Privileges, supra note 29, a t  218; Confidential 
Communications, supra note 30, a t  359. See also MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 215, 
Comment a (1942). 
40. E.g., 8 WIGMORE, supra note 12, 4 2228, a t  216: 
[Tlhe peace of families does not essentially depend on this immunity from 
compulsory testimony, and . . . so far as i t  might be affected, that result is not 
to be allowed to stand in the way of doing justice to others. When one thinks of 
the multifold circumstances of life that contribute to cause marital dissension, 
the liability to give unfavorable testimony appears as only a casual and minor 
one, not to be exaggerated into a foundation for so important a rule. I t  is incor- 
rect to assume that there exists in the normal domestic union an imminent 
danger of shattering an ideal state of harmony solely by the liability to testify 
unfavorably. 
Despite this criticism of the antimarital facts privilege and its disqualification aspect, 
Wigmore would allow the privileged communications rule. Id. 4 2332, a t  643. 
41. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 12, 4 2228, a t  217; Coburn, supra note 2, a t  610 (footnote 
omitted); Husband- Wife Privileges, supra note 29, a t  218-19. 
42. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 12, 4 2228, a t  217-18. Even though Wigmore critizes 
the "repugnancy rationale" in the context of the privilege for antimarital facts, he does 
accept the existence of a privilege for marital communications. Id. 4 2332, a t  643. 
43. "Every state has adopted some form of legislation on the subject . . . ." 
Confidential Communications, supra note 30, a t  360. For a selection of statutes that deal 
with this topic, see 2 WIGMORE, supra note 12, 4 4.88, a t  525 n.2. 
44. See generally MCCORMICK, supra note 8, $$98-105; 8 WIGMORE, supra note 12, $4 
2380-2391. 
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law was at an end." In this country statutory grants of the privi- 
lege were made as early as 1828,4hnd at  the present time over 
two-thirds of the states have statutes recognizing this pri~ilege.~' 
The major policy rationale supporting the privilege is the belief 
that if patients know confidential communications with their 
physicians might later be revealed, they will never disclose all of 
the facts necessary to the effective treatment of their illnesses or 
 affliction^.^^ The immediate effect of the privilege-shielding the 
patient from embarrassment and invasion of his privacy-may be 
a second reason for maintaining the pr i~ i lege .~~ 
Though there is some dispute whether the priest-penitent 
privilege existed at common law,51 it has now been adopted in all 
but four of the fifty states? The major policy rationale support- 
ing this privilege is a "fear that the relationships would not be 
'wholesome' or effective if there were any fear of disclosure of 
confidence~."~~ "A more reasonable justification for the privilege 
is that compelling priests to divulge the substance of communica- 
t i o n ~ " ~ ~  is simply so repugnant that it has been proscribed. 
C. Limitations on the Scope of the Relational Privileges 
Since privileges obstruct the search for truth, the creation of 
45. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 12, (5 2380. 
46. MCCORMICK, supra note 8, (5 98, a t  212. 
47. MCCORMICK, supp  note 8, (5 98, a t  212. These statutes are compiled and recited 
in 8 WIGMORE, supra note 12, (5 2380, a t  819 n.5. 
48. MCCORMICK, supra note 8, # 98, a t  213. See Yow v. Pittman, 241 N.C. 69, 84 
S.E.2d 297, 298 (1954). 
49. See, e.g., Falkinburg v. Prudential Ins. Co., 132 Neb. 831, 273 N.W. 478 (1937) 
(the privilege enables the patient to secure medical treatment without fear of betrayal); 
Woernley v. Electromatic Typewriters, Inc., 271 N.Y. 228,2 N.E.2d 638 (1936) (the privi- 
lege prevents the physician from disclosing matters that might humiliate the patient). 
50. See generally 8 WIGMORE, supra note 12, (58 2394-2396; Callahan, Historical In- 
quiry into the Priest-Penitent Privilege, 36 JURIST 328 (1976); Hogan, A Modern Problem 
on the Privilege of the Confessional, 6 LOY. L. REV. 1 (1951); Stoyles, The Dilemma of the 
Constitutionality of the Priest-Penitent Privilege-The Application of the Religion 
Clauses, 29 U .  Prrr. L. REV. 27 (1967). 
51. The "consensus of the authorities" is that the priest-penitent privilege did not 
exist a t  common law. Stoyles, supra note 50, a t  32 & n.24. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 12, 
(5 2394. Contra, Hogan, supra note 50, a t  7-14. 
52. MCCORMICK, supra note 8, (5 77, a t  158. The statutes are collected in 8 WIGMORE, 
supra note 12, (5 2395, a t  873 n.1. 
53. Fisher, supra note 13, a t  621-22. 
54. Coburn, supra note 2, a t  609-10. 
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new privileges and the maintenance of a broad scope for existing 
ones has generally been met with disfavor by both courtsss and 
commentators.~ This judicial and commentatorial "war" on the 
privileged communications doctrine, with advocates calling for 
either a complete abolition of certain privileges5' or their limita- 
tion, has exerted a substantial influence tending to restrict the 
scope of all relational privileges. Even the most ardent supporters 
of an expansive role for privileged communications have agreed 
the scope of such communications must be reasonably limited? 
The result of the antipathy toward privileges in general has been 
a significant factor in the creation of numerous exceptions to all 
relational privileges. A brief summary of those exceptions will be 
discussed in Section V. 
A parent-child privilege would comport very well with the 
basic notions behind the relational privileges. It would be hard 
to imagine a situation that more strikingly reflects an intimate 
and confidential relation than that which exists between parent 
and child when a distressed young person, perhaps filled with 
remorse and fear, turns to his parents for counsel and guidance. 
Indeed, this was a portion of the rationale behind the court's 
decision in People u. Doe. 
[Tlhe thought of the State forcing a mother and father to re- 
veal their child's alleged misdeeds, as confessed to them in pri- 
vate, to provide the basis for criminal charges is shocking to our 
sense of decency, fairness and propriety. It is inconsistent with 
the way of life we cherish and guard so carefully and raises a 
specter of a regime which encourages betrayal of one's off- 
spring.59 
55. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); United States v. First Nat'l 
City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968); McMann v. SEC, 87 F.2d 377 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, McMann v. Engel, 301 U.S. 684 (1937). 
56. See, e.g., MCCORMICK, supra note 8, 4 79, a t  165; 8 WIGMORE, supra note 12, Ej 
2192; Chafee, Privileged Communications: Is Justice Served or Obstructed by Closing the 
Doctork Mouth on the Witness Stand?, 52 YALE L.J. 607 (1943); McCormick, Law and 
the Future: Evidence, 51 Nw. U.L. REV. 218, 220-21 (1956); Morgan, Some Observations 
('oncerning a Model Code of Evidence, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 145, 150-54 (1940); Morgan, 
Suggested Remedy for Obstructions to Expert Testimony by Rules of Evidence, 10 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 285, 286-92 (1943). 
57. Wigmore argued for the abolition of the physician-patient privilege. 8 WIGMORE, 
supra note 12, 4 2380a. 
58. See, e.g., Slovenko, supra note 7, a t  179-81. 
59. 61 A.D.2d at  433, 403 N.Y.S.2d a t  380. 
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Hence, compelled disclosure of such confidences may be so repug- 
nant that it should be proscribed on this basis alone. The repug- 
nance argument has as much force in this context as in the con- 
text of any of the relational privileges. 
An adolescent's knowledge that his parents may be com- 
pelled to reveal confidential communications may seriously im- 
pair the adolescent's willingness to confide in his parents. Just as 
a privilege in other contexts ostensibly has the purpose of promot- 
ing relations by guarding against apprehension of disclosure, a 
privilege in the parent-child context arguably would maintain the 
freedom of communication necessary to the healthy existence of 
the parent-child relationship. This is not the only manner by 
which a rationale supporting recognition of a parent-child privi- 
lege can be developed, however. The traditional method of ana- 
lyzing "new" privileges is attributed to Dean Wigmore. ' 
The "Wigmore test"" has been applied both by scholarsM in 
attempts to determine whether a privilege should be recognized 
by statute, and by courW2 in determining whether a privilege 
should be recognized in a particular fact situation. The test con- 
sists of four parts. 
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence 
that they will not be disclosed. 
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to 
the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between 
the parties. 
( 3 )  The relation must be one which in the opinion of the 
community ought to be sedulously fostered. 
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the 
disclosure of the communication must be greater than the 
benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of the l i t igati~n.~:~ 
Whether the parent-child privilege meets the requirements of the 
Wigmore test has been discussed fully elsewhereU and the ques- 
tion has been answered affirmatively. 
There is an additional advantage to be gained by recognition 
of the parent-child privilege. If, as likely, the parent refuses to 
- - 
60. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 12, 5 2285. 
61. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 13, at 611-12; Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity 
and Confusion: Privileges in the Federal Court Today, 31 TUL. L. REV. 101, 111 (1956); 
Quick, Privileges Under the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 26 U .  C I N .  L. REV. 537, 538-39 
(1957); Slovenko, supra note 7, at 184-94. 
62. See, e.g., Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411,417 (Alas. 1976); State v. Bixby, 27 Wash. 
2d 144, 177 P.2d 689 (1947). 
63. 8 WICMORE, supra note 12, 5 2285. 
64. Coburn, supra note 2, at 622-32. 
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testify, he has but two alternatives. He may refuse to testify and 
subject himself to contempt proceedings, or he may deliberately 
commit perjury and assume the risk of criminal prosecution. The 
latter course of conduct can only serve to convince the child, who 
may be guilty of antisocial conduct, that "two wrongs do make a 
right" and that "crime does pay,"" while the former course of 
conduct would tend to lead the child to question the fairness of 
the legal system.66 
The fact the parent-child relationship fully accords with the 
basic rationale of provileges and likely meets the requirements of 
the Wigmore test may be of some import when and if a legislature 
considers adopting a statute creating such a privilege. It is un- 
likely, however, that these arguments would persuade a court to 
recognize such a privilege; judicial privilegemaking came to a 
virtual halt a century ago." The state interest in providing judi- 
cial proceedings with all relevant facts is considered so important, 
especially to judges, that i t  may simply overwhelm the arguments 
favoring the recognition of the privilege. As the Supreme Court 
noted in United States v. Nixon? 
The need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary system 
is both fundamental and comprehensive. The ends of criminal 
justice would be defeated if judgements were to be founded on 
a partial or speculative presentation of the facts. The very integ- 
rity of the judicial system and public confidence in the system 
depend on full disclosure of all of the facts, within the frame- 
work of the rules of evidence. To ensure that justice is done, it 
is imperative to the function of courts that compulsory process 
be available for the production of evidence needed either by the 
prosecution or by the defense.69 
Mere policy arguments, irrespective of their cogency, cannot 
be expected to persuade a court to create a privilege covering 
parent-child communications. It is clear that privilegemaking is 
now viewed as a function devolving exclusively on the legisla- 
ture.'O There are, however, constitutional dimensions to the ques- 
65. Id. at 629. 
66. Id. at 628-29. 
67. MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 77, at 156. Courts in this country have indulged in 
privilegemaking only rarely in recent history. See, e.g., Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 
275,279 (D.C.. Cir. 1959) (Fahy, J., concurring); Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411 (Alas. 1976); 
Binder v. Ruvell, 150 A.M.A.J. 1241 (1952) (Ill. Cir. Ct. 1952). 
68. 418 US. 683 (1974). 
69. Id. at 709. 
70. Even the Doe court felt disposed to leave the privilegemaking function to the 
legislature. 61 A.D.2d at 434-35, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 381. 
1012 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I978 
tion of parent-child communicative privacy which may compel 
courts to recognize such a privilege. 
IV. RECOGNITION OF THE PARENT-CHILD PRIVILEGE AS A
CONSTITUTIONAL MATTER 
A. Early Protections of Familial Rights 
The common law of both England and the United States took 
cognizance of the family as the primordial social, political, and 
economic unit,71 affording it such deference that the family be- 
came a legally autonomous unit.72 Familial autonomy was charac- 
terized as an "inherent, natural right, for the protection of which, 
just as much for the protection of the rights of the individual to 
life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, our government is 
f~rrned."'~ This legal panoply constructed around the family was 
later incorporated with even greater force into the constitutional 
law of the United States. 
The constitutional protection of familial autonomy has its 
- - - - - -  
71. See Hafen, Childrenls Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some Reserva- 
tions A bout Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights, " 1976 B.Y .U. L. REV. 605, 615; Note, 
The Fundamental Right to Family Integrity and Its Role in New York Foster Care 
Adjudication, 44 BROOKLYN L. REV. 63, 66-70 (1977). 
72. Note, The Fundamental Right to Family 'Integrity and Its Role in New York 
Foster Care Adjudication, 44 BROOKLYN L. REV. 63, 66-68 (1977) (footnotes omitted): 
At common law, parents have been presumptively entitled to the custody of 
their children, thereby enabling the family to perform its historic functions. 
Parental custody, perhaps the most basic component of the right to family 
integrity, involves more than mere physical control of children. It  includes other 
duties: the support and care of one's children and the control over their conduct 
by instruction and discipline. And it  includes other rights: the right to utilize 
the services of one's children, to share their companionship, and to supervise 
their moral, religious, and intellectual education. Although these additional 
rights and duties flow from the parents' physical custody of their children, they 
do not depend on immediate physical control. For example, parents whose chil- 
dren are in school have in effect delegated part of their right to educate their 
children, but they may still legally supervise the children's course of study and 
veto particular aspects of it. And if parents separate, the duty to support may 
remain in the father even though the mother has physical custody. 
At common law, children, too, can claim rights to family integrity. Their 
rights and duties are often reciprocal to those of their parents-for example, the 
child's right to receive and the parent's duty to provide support and the child's 
duty to perform and parental right to the benefit of the child's services. Children 
may also claim under a mutual right of parent and child to a continuing heri- 
tage-the parent has a right to rear and teach his child, and the child has a right 
to he brought up by, and learn from, his own parent. That children have an 
assertable interest in parental custody belies the much-disputed but still fash- 
ionable theory that, at common law, children were treated as the chattel of their 
parents. 
73. Lacher v. Venus, 177 Wis. 558, 569-70, 188 N.W. 613, 617 (1922). 
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roots in substantive due proce~s.'~ Although substantive due pro- 
cess had its heyday in the economic and social sphere, the doc- 
trine was also applied in areas involving familial rights." The 
economic utilization of substantive due process was repudiated in 
the 1 9 3 0 ' ~ ~ ~  in favor of a "minimum rationality" test" and was, 
in the words of Justice Black, "laid . . . to rest once and for all."7X 
That portion of substantive due process that called into play a 
heightened judicial scrutiny in the areas of familial or personal 
rights, however, was never explicitly overturned. In fact its con- 
tinued existence was noted by Justice Stone in his famous foot- 
74. Substantive due process "refers to the principle that a law adversely affecting an 
individual's life, liberty, or property is invalid, even though offending no specific constitu- 
tional prohibition, unless the law serves a legitimate governmental objective." Perry, 
Substantive Due Process Revisited: Reflections on (and Beyond) Recent Cases, 71 Nw. 
U.L. REV. 417, 419 (1976). I t  has also been characterized as "the judicial practice of 
constitutionalizing values that cannot fairly be inferred from the constitutional text, the 
structure of governmental ordained by the Constitution, or historical materials clarifying 
otherwise vague constitutional provisions." Id. (footnote omitted). 
The doctrine of substantive due process first emerged in the dissenting opinions of 
the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 83-130 (1873), wherein the view was 
expressed that the fourteenth amendment imposed a substantive restraint on state legisla- 
tion. Id. a t  111-24 (Bradley, J., dissenting). Justice Bradley's seemingly bold assertion was 
simply the exposition of the older theme of "natural law" which others a t  an earlier date 
had attempted to import into the Constitution. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 
(1798) (Chase, J., separate opinion). The doctrine of substantive due process first per- 
suaded a majority of the Court in Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897). 
75. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 
262 U.S. 390 (1923). In Meyer, the Court reversed the conviction of a teacher who had 
taught German in a public school in violation of a state statute prohibiting the teaching 
of foreign languages to young children. Justice McReynolds thought that the "liberty" of 
the due process clause encompassed personal as well as economic rights. 
Without doubt, it [liberty] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint, 
but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common 
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to many, establish a home and 
bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own consci- 
ence, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized a t  common law as 
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. 
262 U.S. a t  399. Justice McReynolds found that the Nebraska law interfered with the 
calling of modern language teachers, with the opportunities of children to acquire knowl- 
edge, and with the power of parents to control their child's education. Id. at  401. 
In Pierce the Court sustained a challenge to a statute requiring children to attend only 
public schools because the law interfered "with the liberty of parents and guardians to 
direct the upbringing of children under their control." 268 U.S. a t  534-35. 
76. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v.  New York, 
291 U.S. 502 (1934). 
77. The minimum rationality test meant the Court would no longer make a meaning- 
ful scrutiny of economic regulations beyond that envisioned in the rational basis test. See 
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 
U.S. 379 (1937). 
78. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 522 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting). 
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note to United States v. Carolene Products CO.?~  precisely a t  a 
time when the economic and social utilization of substantive due 
process was clearly in d i s r e p ~ t e . ~ ~  The distinction drawn between 
economic and personal rights was implicitly given life by subse- 
quent cases that, although not explicitly relying on the due pro- 
cess clause, seemingly utilized the principle to protect personal 
rights not specifically mentioned in the Bill of Rights? Personal 
(as well as familial) rights were viewed as coming to the Court 
"with a momentum for respect lacking when an appeal is made 
to liberties which derive merely from shifting economic arrange- 
ments. "82 
B. Familial Autonomy and the  Right of  Privacy 
1. General contours of the right of privacy 
The newest phase of constitutional protection for familial 
rights had its genesis in 1965 in Griswold v. Connecticut. " In that 
case the Court struck down a Connecticut law which forbade the 
use of contraceptives even by married couples. After rejecting an 
invitation to utilize Lochner in the resolution of the contr~versy,~" 
the majority reasoned that certain provisions of the Bill of Rights 
created penumbras of constitutional protection that, although 
not specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights, must be recog- 
nized since "[wlithout those peripheral rights the specific rights 
would be less secure."" The penumbral rights of the first, third, 
fourth, and fifth amendments, taken together, created a "zone of 
privacy" which, absent certain circumstances, the state could not 
enter.V'he right of privacy guarantee has been called the "new 
due process"87 and rightly so, for the Court has explicitly recog- 
nized that the privacy cases actually rest on the "liberty" interest 
protected by the due process clause.R8 Even when Griswold was 
79. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
80. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v .  New York, 
291 U.S. 502 (1934). 
81. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479 (1965); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 
316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
82. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
83. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
84. Id. at 482. 
85. Id. at 482-83. 
86. Id. at 484-86. 
87. Dixon, The "New" Substantive Due Process and the  Democratic Ethic: A 
Prolegomenon, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 43; 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 977, 980-81. 
88. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 & n.23 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 
( 197.3). 
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handed down, many recognized that i t  was simply substantive 
due process under another nameeSg 
"The concept of a constitutional right to privacy still re- 
mains largely ~ n d e f i n e d . " ~ ~  In Whalen v. Roeg1 the Court at-  
tempted to bring some order to the area by recognizing that  
"[tlhe cases sometimes characterized as protecting 'privacy' 
have in fact involved at  least two kinds of interests. One is the 
individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and 
another is the interest in independence in making certain kinds 
of important  decision^."^^ These divergent "strands" of privacy 
have elicited two separate responses from the Supreme Court. 
The protection accorded the interest in confidentiality is argua- 
bly not as great as the protection afforded the decisionmaking 
autonomy interestg3 In the autonomy area, if the governmental 
intrusion invades a "fundamental" personal right,g4 the intrusion 
will be allowed only if there is a "sufficiently compelling state 
interest."95 Even with the presence of a compelling state interest, 
however, the state's intrusion upon the right must be no broader 
than is necessary. That is, the " 'governmental purpose to control 
or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation 
may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily 
broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.' " g l  
2. Parent-child communicative privacy as a fundamental right 
Before a particular autonomy interest may legitimately fall 
under the protective umbrella of the right of privacy, it must be 
89. Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental and Things 
Forgotten: The Griswold Case, 64 MICH. L. REV. 235, 251-54 (1965). 
90. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 n.24 (1977) (quoting Kurland, The Prioate I, 
U. OF CHI. MAGAZINE, Autumn 1976, a t  7, 8). 
91. 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
92. Id. a t  598-99 (footnotes omitted). 
93. The Court has only considered the confidentiality branch of the right of privacy 
two times. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977); Whalen v. Roe, 
429 U.S. 589 (1977). Because the possibility of public disclosure was so remote, the Court 
in Whalen v .  Roe did not discuss what test, if any, should be applied in such cases. In 
Nixon, the Court recognized Nixon's legitimate expectation of privacy in some of his 
Presidential papers and balanced the respective interests of Nixon against those of the 
law. Since the public interest was important and the screening necessary, the balance was 
struck in favor of the government. Thus, the test in the confidentiality strand of the right 
of privacy involves balancing, with the scales preweighted slightly in the individual's 
favor. See Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1134 (5th Cir. 1978). The test in the auton- 
omy strand of the right of privacy is much more stringent, requiring a showing of a 
"compelling state interest" to override an individual's claim of privacy. See Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497-98 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
94. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). 
95. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l., 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977) (emphasis added). 
96. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 497, 485 (1965) (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 
377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964)). 
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determined that the interest is fundamental." The initial focus 
of judicial scrutiny is thus shifted away from the alleged constitu- 
tional infringement to the nature of the right itself. The Supreme 
Court has characterized the fundamental rights protected by the 
automony strand of the right of privacy as including "matters 
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family 
relationships, and child rearing and education. "YY Also regarded 
as fundamental are activities related to the right of families to 
live together;ss the right of parents to the care, custody, and con- 
trol of their children;Io0 and the right to associate with family 
members."" 
Taken collectively, these decisions comprise a right of fami- 
lial autonomy; i. e . ,  the right of the family as a unit to be free from 
undue governmental influence in making certain decisions and in 
engaging in certain activities. The question here is whether the 
interest of parent and child in communicative privacy is funda- 
mental and thus incidental to the right of familial autonomy. 
Since parent-child communications are a t  the very heart of fam- 
ily life and relationships, they can properly be classed as funda- 
mental along with those familial rights that the automony strand 
of the right of privacy is designed to protect. Consonant with this 
anaylsis, the court in People u. Doe refused to disturb the lower 
court's ruling that Doe's parents need not testify concerning the 
substance of any confidential communications they may have 
had with their son.Io2 The court thus followed such venerable 
familial autonomy precedents as Meyer v. Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters, and Stanley v. Illinois, I" which all afforded 
the parent-child relationship some measure of constitutional pro- 
tection.IM 
The view of the court in Doe that parent-child communica- 
tive privacy is a fundamental right was not, of course, the only 
view the court could have taken. In re Terry W. Irn involved essen- 
97. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). 
98. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976) (emphasis added). 
99. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
100. See Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Doe v. Irwin, 441 F. Supp. 
1247 (W.D. Mich. 1977). 
101. Drollinger v. Milligan, 552 F.2d 1220 (7th Cir. 1977). 
102. 61 A.D.2d a t  434-35, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 381. 
103. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
104. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
105. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
106. Stanley dealt with the right of a father to the custody and companionship of his 
children. The rights of parent and child protected by Meyer and Pierce are discussed in 
note 75 supra. 
107. 59 Cal. App. 3d 745, 130 Cal. Rptr. 913 (1976). 
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tially the same question presented in Doe. In that case the only 
evidence linking Terry W. with a burglary was an alleged confes- 
sion to his mother, who desired to testify as to the substance of 
the confession in a juvenile delinquency proceeding. Terry 
claimed the communication was constitutionally protected by his 
right of privacy and should therefore be excluded from the pro- 
ceeding. In ruling to allow the testimony, the court refused to 
extend the right of privacy to protect such communications, rea- 
soning that the right was limited to husband and wife.'" While 
the court may have had justifiable reasons for not basing a 
parent-child privilege on the right of privacy in the circumstances 
before it,Io9 the court's apparent rationale-that the right of pri- 
vacy does not include the parent-child relationship-was without 
merit. 
3. Compulsory disclosure as a violation of the right of privacy 
. 
Another issue involved in right of privacy analysis is whether 
the inhibiting effect of compulsory disclosure constitutes a direct 
or incidental burden on parent-child communications. This 
direct-incidental burden dichotomy was an important factor in 
Justice White's majority opinion in Branr burg v. Hayes, ' lo a case 
with a setting similar to the situation in Doe, but involving an 
explicit constitutional right-freedom of the press. In that case, 
the district attorney was attempting to force a reporter to reveal 
the sources of information he had utilized in writing a story relat- 
ing to criminal activities. Just as Doe argued that disclosure or 
the prospect of disclosure would create an atmosphere in which 
parent-child communications would be impaired,lI1 the reporter 
argued that disclosure would destroy relationships and potential 
relationships between a reporter and his sources. Both cases argu- 
ably involved the infringement of a fundamental right-Doe's 
right to privacy and Branzburg's right to freedom of the press. 
In response to the claim that compelled disclosure violated 
the reporter's fundamental interest in freedom of the press, the 
Branzburg majority noted that the "First Amendment does not 
invalidate every incidental burdening of the press that may result 
from the enforcement of civil or criminal statutes of general appl- 
108. Id. at 749, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 914-15. 
109. See notes 156-63 and accompanying text infra. 
110. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
111. Brief for Respondent at 14-16, People v. Doe, 61 A.D.2d 426, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375 
( 1978). 
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icability."lI2 In cases raising the claim of governmental intrusion 
upon fundamental interests, there must be more than an 
"indirect" effect produced by the governmental activity on the 
interest,lt3 or, stated differently, the threat of interference with 
the fundamental right posed by the governmental activity must 
be "sufficiently grievous" to "establish a constitutional viola- 
t i ~ n . " ~ l T h e  Branzburg Court reasoned that since the "inhibiting 
effect of such subpoenas on the willingness of informants to make 
disclosures" to newsmen was speculative,115 the burden on free 
press could only be incidental and no violation of a fundamental 
interest had occurred. 
Arguably, forcing disclosure of parent-child communications 
would only indirectly or incidentally burden that fundamental 
interest. The state does not directly place a restraint on what the 
communicants may or may not say, nor does it threaten the vast 
bulk of confidential communications between parent and child. 
I t  could be argued that the truly important communications be- 
tween parent and child have little to do with crimes the child may 
have committed: of the thousands of communications between 
parent and child, those involving discussion of the child's legal 
misdeeds would be minuscule. In any event, i t  may be expecting 
too much of the adolescent mind to believe that a child who 
would otherwise admit legal wrongdoing to parents would, know- 
ing that a parent could later be compelled to testify concerning 
his confession, be deterred in making such communications. Any 
"chilling effect" on the child, or the parent for that matter, is just 
as incidental a burden in this case as in the case of the reporter 
and his source. 
I t  can persuasively be maintained, however, that the burden 
on the fundamental interest of parents and children in communi- 
cative privacy rises to the violation of a constitutional right. Ir- 
respective of whether a burden on a constitutional right is consid- 
112. 408 US.  at 682 (emphasis added). 
113. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), in its equal protection analy- 
sis the Court differentiated the burden there on the right to marry and the burden on 
the same right in another case, Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977). For the Court, the 
difference in the outcome of the two cases was explained by the fact that the governmental 
intrusion in Jobst was only indirect, while the interference in Redhail was direct. See also 
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U S .  589 (1977) (confidentiality interest of the right of privacy not 
burdened because the supposed governmental interference was not "sufficiently p i -  
evious"); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U S .  665 (1972) (freedom of press only incidentally 
burdened); Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1131-32 & n.19 (5th Cir. 1978) ("secondary 
effects" on familial privacy are not enough to establish a violation of the right). 
114. Whalen v. Roe, 429 US.  589, 600 (1977). 
115. 408 U.S. at 693-94. 
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ered indirect or incidental, it is still a burden and "a little impair- 
ment of constitutional rights is no more possible than it is possi- 
ble for a girl to be just a little pregnant."ll"ven incidental bur- 
dens on constitutional rights should not be tolerated. All of the 
major relational privileges are based primarily on the theory that 
a privilege is necessary in a particular context to assure freedom 
of disclosure117 and thus prevent any "chilling effects" on the 
communicant's desires to communicate. It is. because of these 
potentially adverse effects on confidential communications that 
relational privileges are widely accepted and have continued to 
expand in their number and scope.l18 The number and scope of 
privileges suggest that these chilling effects are substantial. 
Perhaps most importantly, the comparison between the 
newsman-source relationship and that of parent-child is unfitting 
at  best. Both the qualitative and quantitative aspects of the re- 
spective relationships are different. A source does not rely on a 
newsman for love, support, and guidance as a child relies on his 
parent, nor are the types of trust and confidence essential to the 
relationships comparable. As the court in Doe noted: 
Child psychologists and behavioral scientists generally agree 
that it is essential to the parent-child relationship that the lines 
of communication remain open and that the child be encour- 
aged to "talk out" his problems. It is therefore critical to a 
child's emotional development that he know that he may ex- 
plore his problems in an atmosphere of trust and understanding 
without fear that his confidences will later be revealed to oth- 
e r ~ . " ~  
If the newsman loses access to his source because of a breach 
of trust or because of apprehension of disclosure on the part of the 
source, the newsman may find another fountain of information 
and arguably the right of free press has not been infringed. How- 
ever, after forced disclosure in the parent-child context, the child 
is not able to find new parents. Once the parent is compelled to 
divulge confidences which may incriminate the child, the right of 
the child to the guidance and counsel of his parents may be effec- 
tively lost.120 If his parents have previously been compelled to 
116. Quick, Constitutional Rights in the Juvenile Court, 12 How. L.J. 76, 77 (1966). 
117. See notes 27, 39, 48, 53 and accompanying text supra. 
118. There are now privileges covering journalists, accountants, psychologists, confi- 
dential clerks or stenographers, public school teachers, psychiatrists, and social workers. 
See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2286. 
119. 61 A.D.2d at 432, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 380 (footnote omitted). 
120. If parents have the constitutional right to guide and counsel their children, see 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); 
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reveal his confidences and the child, rightly or wrongly, now re- 
fuses to confide in them, to whom will the child turn when he 
needs counsel and guidance the most?lZ1 There is a great differ- 
ence between requiring a newsman to dig deeper and harder for 
news and requiring a parent to breach a trust affecting the quality 
of a relationship having the single greatest influence on his child's 
entire future life. 
4. Compelling state interest test 
The mere fact that an aspect of the fundamental right of 
familial autonomy may be burdened does not of itself compel the 
recognition of a parent-child privilege. The particular autonomy 
interest may nevertheless be regulated if there is a "sufficiently 
compelling state interest."l2"n Branzburg the Court pointed out 
that the state interest in factfinding was at least impelling: "Fair 
and effective law enforcement aimed at providing security for the 
person and property of the individual is a fundamental function 
of government."ln There can be little doubt the state interest in 
the investigation of crime is an important one, and thus it may 
be argued that despite any constitutional infringement the state 
should prevail. However, when governmental activity encroaches 
on a bona fide fundamental interest, recognition that the state 
interest is vital is not dispositive. For example, in Wisconsin v. 
Yoder,'" after recognizing that the state interest in education 
"ranks at the very apex of the function of a state,"12Vhe Court 
refused to accept the state's claim that its interest was free from 
a balancing process. The Court noted that "a State's interest 
. . . , however highly we rank it ,  is not totally free from a bal- 
ancing process when it impinges on fundamental rights and in- 
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U S .  390 (1923), surely children have the right to receive that 
counsel and guidance. 
121. Doe's counsel persuasively argued: 
How can a parent be expected to effectively exercise his right and discharge his 
duty to appropriately guide the child in accordance with a perception of his best 
interests? Will parent and child ever be a t  peace to again live within the tranquil 
and free atmosphere of their home after a parent has been compelled to testify 
concerning communications conveyed to him in confidence by his minor child 
and perhaps disclose facts which may incriminate him? Will the child ever feel 
free to speak confidentially to his parent again? 
Brief for Respondent at  15, People v. Doe, 61 A.D.2d 426, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1978). 
122. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U S .  678, 686 (1977) (emphasis added). 
123. 408 US.  a t  690 (emphasis added). 
124. 406 US.  205 (1972). 
125. Id. a t  213. 
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terests."l2"he state interest must be sufficiently compelling.iYi 
The state's interest in investigation of crime and the accu- 
mulation of all facts relevant to a judicial proceeding is unques- 
tionably one of its most important interests. Neither can it be 
denied that a privilege in many cases interferes with that interest 
or may even stifle it completely. Compelling a parent to testify 
"may be not only a highly convenient aid to accurate fact finding, 
but in some instances [it may be] the sine qua non of discovery 
of the full truth."12n Additionally, "[e]xemptions lessen the fair- 
ness of a trial, inasmuch as a trial is only as good as the evidence 
considered by the court."129 Recognition of the parent-child privi- 
lege will not find favor with evidence scholars whose antipathy 
toward all privileges arises from the belief that the preeminent 
position of the state interest in factfinding requires a subordina- 
tion of the values of confidentiality in nearly all relational con- 
t e x t ~ ? ~  
Yet this state interest should not and can not be exalted to 
the status of an absolute. If this interest were absolute, there 
would be no requirement of probable cause, no prohibition of 
unreasonable searches and seizures, and certainly no privilege 
against self-incrimination. The contemporaneous existence of 
these rights and the state interest in accumulation of facts dem- 
onstrates that "there are things even more important to human 
liberty than accurate a d j ~ d i c a t i o n . " ~ ~ ~  Professor Louisell has 
noted that: 
It is the historic judgment of the common law, as it apparently 
is of European law and is generally in western society, that 
whatever handicapping of the adjudicatory process is caused by 
recognition of the privileges, it is not too great a price to pay for 
secrecy in certain communicative relations . . . . 132 
There is a cluster of familial rights which antedates both the 
state and its interests. These rights have enjoyed a position of 
judicial preference since the early days of common law and that 
preference was incorporated into the constitutional law of this 
126. Id. at 214 (emphasis added). 
127. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977). 
128. Louisell, The Psychologist in Today's Legal World: Part 11, 41 MINN. L. REV. 731, 
750 (1957). 
129. Slovenko, supra note 7, at 177. 
130. See, e.g., MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 79, at 165; 8 WIGMORE, supra note 12, 
§ 2192. 
131. Louisell, supra note 61, at 110. 
132. Id. 
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country more than fifty years ago? It should be clear that 
the family unit does not simply co-exist with our constitutional 
system; it is an integral part of it. In democratic theory as well 
as in practice, it is in the family that children are expected to 
learn the values and beliefs that democratic institutions later 
draw on to determine group directions. The immensely impor- 
tant power of deciding about matters of early socialization has 
been allocated to the family, not to the g0~ernment.I~~ 
Not only has the state been hesitant to intervene in family affairs, 
it is in fact inadequate to perform essential family func- 
tions-such as the guidance and counseling of children in trou- 
ble. 135 
A careful consideration of the importance of the right of fam- 
ilial autonomy in general and of the parent-child relationship in 
particular clearly demonstrates that parent-child communica- 
tions constitute a portion of the "private realm of family life 
which the state cannot enter."lM The state interest in making 
available all relevant facts in a judicial proceeding must give way 
to this fundamental constitutional right. Generally the state has 
at its command all of the resources necessary for effective fact 
investigation without the need to intrude on the communications 
of parent and child. The idea that familial communications must 
be reached by the state to ensure effective law enforcement was 
never accepted at Roman law,ls7 and the prevailing view in the 
civil law countries of Western Europe for many years has been 
that no one may be forced to divulge confidences between himself 
and another family member.l3 The idea that such communica- 
tions merit some sort of legal protection is certainly not novel. 
133. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
134. Heymann & Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and Its Critics, 
53 B.U.L. REV. 765, 772-73 (1973). 
135. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 
49-50 (1973) : 
The law, as far as specific individual relationships are concerned, is a relatively 
crude instrument. . . . It neither has the sensitivity nor the resources to main- 
tain or supervise the ongoing day-to-day happenings between parent and 
child-and these are essential to meeting ever-changing demands and needs. 
Nor does it have the capacity to predict future events and needs, which would 
justify or make workable over the long run any specific conditions it might 
impose concerning, for example, education, visitation, health care, or religious 
upbringing. 
136. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). 
137. See Radin, supra note 21, a t  488. 
138. See, e.g., 7 AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES, French Code of Civil 
Procedure Q 335 (G. Koch trans. 1963); 9 id., German Code of Criminal Procedure 8 52(3) 
(H. Niebler trans. 1965); 15 id., Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure, ch. 36, Q 3 (A. 
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5. Striking the balance 
The balance struck in cases involving fundamental auton- 
omy interests and important state interests does not have to be 
an all-or-nothing proposition: the question need not be one of 
total immunity or total disclosure. In Roe u. Wade'39 those assert- 
ing the autonomy strand of privacy in the abortion context argued 
a woman should have complete independence in making the deci- 
sion of whether to abort the fetus,14While the state insisted it had 
a compelling interest in the life of the unborn child which made 
any decision to abort subject to regulation.I4' The Court agreed 
the autonomy interest in making the abortion decision was con- 
stitutionally protected, yet did not go so far as to entirely subordi- 
nate the state interest to the autonomy interest. The Court held 
the state interest was not sufficient to overcome the woman's 
privacy interest during the first trimester of pregnancy,Id2 but 
after that point the state interest became compelling enough to 
subordinate the privacy interest. ld3 
The conclusion that parent-child communications should be 
included in the right of familial autonomy does not mean that all 
such communications require constitutional protection, just as 
the view that a woman's decision to have an abortion was consti- 
tutionally protected did not mean that under no circumstances 
could the  s ta te  regulate her decision. I t  simply means 
"communications made by a minor child to his parents within the 
context of the family relationship may, under some 
circumstances, lie within the 'private realm of family life which 
the state cannot enter.' Even though such a right may justify 
the refusal of Doe's parents to testify concerning confidential 
communications, i t  does not necessarily require that Terry's 
mother remain silent at  a juvenile delinquency hearing when she 
believes her son's best interests would be served by disclosure. 
The creation and delimitation of privileges is a matter that 
Bruzelius & R. Ginsburg trans. 1967). Apparently neither Soviet law, 1 V. GSOVSKI, SOVIET 
CIVIL AW, 118-19 (1948), nor English law, Phipson on Evidence $ 0  581-587 (11th ed. 1970), 
allow such a privilege. 
139. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
140. Id. at 156. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. at 163. 
143. Id. 
144. 61 A.D.2d at 435,403 N.Y .S.2d at 381 (emphasis added) (citing Prince v. Massa- 
chusetts, 321 US. 158, 166 (1944)). 
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in modern experience has almost exclusively been left to legisla- 
tive judgment.lJ5 Even though the court in Doe sanctioned the 
prerogative of the parents not to testify and in so doing implicitly 
recognized a parent-child privilege, it explicitly refused the invi- 
tation to create a full "privilege" despite its belief parent-child 
communications met the requirements of Wigmore's test.Id6 Al- 
though the court held that under some circumstances communi- 
cations made by a minor to his parents in the family context were 
constitutionally privileged, the court expressed its belief that 
"the creation of a privilege .devolves exclusively on the Legisla- 
ture."ld7 While the court cannot be faulted for refusing to create 
a "privilege," such a result is unsatisfactory because it fails to 
establish a uniform approach to the question. 
Just as the established relational privileges are not extended 
to situations where extension is not necessary to further the pur- 
pose of the privilege, it may reasonably be expected that a parent- 
child privilege would not be and should not be available in situa- 
tions where it is nether logically nor constitutionally necessary. 
Exceptions to the privacy afforded parent-child communications, 
however, may be made only where there is a constitutional as 
opposed to a social reason for doing so. The remainder of this 
Section investigates possible exceptions to and limitations of the 
parent -child privilege. 
A. The Confidentiality Requirement 
If a communication is to be protected by the panoply of 
privilege, it must have been made in confidence. This general rule 
is applicable to all the major relational privilegesld8 and comports 
with the reasoning supporting most privileges. If the parties in- 
volved did not care to maintain the secrecy of the communica- 
tion, the revelation of such conversations cannot be thought to be 
repugnant. Nor can it be said the need to avoid apprehension of 
disclosure protects communications that are nonconfidential in 
nature. If the parties themselves have revealed the confidence to 
third parties, the parties have manifested that no such apprehen- 
sion exists. In privacy cases, the known presence of third parties 
145. MCCORMICK, supra note 8, Q 77, at 156. 
146. 61 A.D.2d at 434-35, 403 N.Y .S.2d at 381. 
147. Id. 
148. This is true of the husband-wife privilege, MCCORMICK, supra note 8, Q 80; 
the priest-penitent privilege, Stoyles, supra note 50, at 36-37; the attorney-client privi- 
lege, 8 WIGMORE, supm note 12, $9 2311-2313; and the physician-patient privilege, Mc- 
CORMICK, SUPM note 8, Q 101. 
10021 PARENT- CHILD PRIVILEGE 1025 
to an act, that if done in private would be constitutionally pro- 
tected, vitiates the constitutional protection afforded by the right 
of privacy.I4' Thus, a legislature or court could constitutionally 
impose a confidentiality requirement on the parent-child privi- 
lege. The question is, would it be wise to do so? 
Many children, due to their relative immaturity, simply can- 
not be expected to act like adults. They may have no conception 
of what it means to communicate in private. Additionally, the 
normal family household may well be a place wherein privacy is 
unattainable. The presence of other family members during such 
communications may not only be probable, but may in fact be 
impossible to avoid. It may therefore be necessary to prevent 
other family members from testifying to protect the intimacy of 
parent-child communications. However, courts and legislatures 
could go one step further. If in fact the familial right of privacy 
protects parent-child communications, that protection should 
attach unless the communicants knowingly admit a third party 
to the confidential communication. This would accord with stan- 
dard constitutional doctrine-waiver of constitutional rights 
must be knowing and informed.150 
B. Setting the  Bounds of Childhood 
There can be little doubt the most potent influence on a child 
is his family. Once children leave the home and begin to lead 
their own lives, however, this influence and the need to maintain 
the privacy of child-parent communication may be expected to 
decrease. In other words, the potential destructiveness of forced 
disclosure on the future of the relationship would be greatly less- 
ened, as would the repugnance to such a procedure. That is not 
t o  say the forced disclosure would have no impact on the relation; 
it could affect the parent-child relationship. But, in view of the 
presumptive maturity of the adult child and due to the probable 
decrease in the frequency and necessity for confidential commu- 
nications between parent and child, the impact of forced disclo- 
sure on the relationship could be expected to significantly de- 
crease. As an adult, no longer within the family structure on a 
day-to-day basis nor dependent upon it for counsel and suste- 
nance, such a "child" would be in a different position than an 
unemancipated minor. 
The delicate balance between the significant state interest in 
149. See Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1976). 
150. Even the privilege against self-incrimination is subject to waiver. See Miranda 
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966). 
1026 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I978 
fact accumulation and the familial interest in communicative 
privacy in the case of an emancipated child would be tipped in 
favor of the state and disclosure could be compelled. Given the 
importance of the state interest, the decrease in the significance 
of the relationship, and the declining impact of disclosure on that 
relationship, a contrary result in the case of emancipated children 
would amount to exaltation of theory over the practical realities 
of life. 
C. Actions in Which the Parent and Child Become Adverse 
Once the parties to a confidential communication become 
adverse parties in litigation, the rationale mandating the privacy 
of their communications has vanished. Thus, in a divorce action 
either spouse may testify concerning confidential communica- 
tions;lJ1 in an action by the client against his lawyer the attorney 
may reveal otherwise excludable confidences;lJ2 and in an action 
for malpractice the physician may divulge confidences he gener- 
ally could not reveal.'" Once the parties become adverse as to a 
matter that relates to the communication, there is no good reason 
for suppressing testimony as to the substance of the communica- 
tion. The need to foster the relationship by protecting its confid- 
ences is obviated once the relationship has detiorated to the point 
the communicants acquire adverse legal interests, as in the case 
of a wife who is beaten by her husband. 
The argument against such an exception would be that since 
the right to communicative privacy is constitutionally based, it 
simply cannot be diluted. The right of privacy, however, is not 
absolute. When parent and child have adverse interests in a legal 
dispute they in truth are wearing two hats: first, they are adver- 
saries; and second, they are members of the same family. By 
involving themselves in such a dispute the parent and child have 
removed the communication from the "private realm of family 
life which the state may not enter,"lJ4 and have, by putting the 
particular matter in dispute, called into question the evidence 
necessary to resolve the dispute.lJ5 Once the parent or child vio- 
151. MCCORMICK, supra note 8, 4 84, at 171; 8 WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2338. 
152. MCCORMICK, supra note 8, $ 91, at 191. 
153. Id. 8 104; 8 WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2385. 
154. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). 
155. See In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415,467 P.2d 557,85 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1970), wherein 
the court held that a litigant who puts a matter in controversy may not interpose a 
privilege, even though the privilege may have a constitutional basis in the right of privacy. 
See also Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1976), noted in 10 LOY. L. REV. 
696 (1977). 
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lates the rights of the other communicants, by subjecting him to 
a beating for example, he should not be able to exclude the evi- 
dence of his misdeeds by recourse to the privilege. Thus, a court 
or legislature would be justified in allowing the parent to testify 
in cases where parent and child are adverse parties. 
D. The Holder of the Privilege 
Suppose A's son, C, relates in confidence to A the fact he has 
committed a crime. A firmly believes C should turn himself in 
and counsels C to do so. C fears doing so will ruin his chances for 
acceptance at  law school and refuses. A goes to the police and is 
called as a witness at trial. Should C be able to claim the privilege 
and suppress the testimony? 
In the case of the attorney-client relation, the desire of the 
attorney to reveal a client's confidence is of no import since the 
privilege belongs to the client.lM The same is generally true of the 
physician-patient privilege.'" In the case of the husband-wife 
privilege, a spouse may prevent testimony concerning a confiden- 
tial communication despite the willingness of his partner to tes- 
tify.15% is reasoned that allowing the state to reach confidential 
communications when one of the parties is willing to divulge the 
substance of such communications would not prevent apprehen- 
sion of full disclosure. Arguably, if a child knows a parent may 
later betray him even though the parent could not be forced to 
do so, there exists a disincentive to fully talk out all of his prob- 
lems. Just as the relational privileges allow the communicant to 
prevent the testimony of his cocommunicant, even though the 
cocommunicant is willing to testify, it could be argued the child 
should be able to prevent testimony concerning confidential com- 
munications despite the willingness or desire of his parent to 
testify. 
There is, however, an argument to be made in favor of the 
proposition that a parent should be able to reveal such confid- 
ences over the objections of his child. In most cases parents are 
in a better position than the child to know what would be in the 
child's best interest.'" Perhaps the confidence Terry's mother 
revealed to the court resulted in the very kind of experience re- 
quired to prevent Terry from becoming a truly nefarious charac- 
lfi6. See MCCORMICK, supra note 8, 4 92, at 192. 
157. Both Wigmore and McCormick state that the privilege belongs to the patient. 
MCCORMICK, supra note 8, 4 102, at 218; 8 WIGMORE, supra note 12, 8 2386, at 851. 
158. See MCCORMICK, supra note 8, 8 83. 
159. Hafen, supra note 71, at 651-56. 
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ter. A close examination of the cases establishing a zone of fami- 
lial autonomy reveals that the right consists largely of the rights 
of parents to the care, custody, control, and upbringing of their 
children."O Hence, the parent-child communication privilege is 
arguably held only by the parent; the parent, considering the best 
interest of the child, decides whether to withold information or 
whether to disclose such information. To prevent him from doing 
so may well be an invasion of his constitutionally protected right 
to make decisions with respect to the upbringing of his children. 
Yet the constitutional rights of the parents are not the only 
constitutional rights that may be asserted. The child has an au- 
tonomy interest in making the decision of whether to communi- 
cate certain confidences to his parents. However, although the 
Supreme Court has accorded minors most of the constitutional 
rights enjoyed by adults,161 the Court, noting the special position 
that children occupy in the social scheme, has recognized in a 
number of cases that the privacy rights of minors ar not coequal 
with those of adults.Ib2 Because a parent may in fact know what 
course of action is in the best interests of the child and because 
the right of the parent to disclose is a t  least coequal with the right 
of the child to prevent disclosure, there should be a requirement 
that the parent participate in claiming the privilege.Ib3 
160. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 
U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 
1302 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Doe v. Irwin, 441 F. Supp. 1247 (W.D. Mich. 1977). 
161. See Note, Parental Consent Requirements and Privacy Rights of Minors: The 
Contraceptive Controversy, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1001, 1008-09 (1975). 
162. The cases that afford minors lesser rights than adults in the privacy area are 
discussed in Note, The Minor's Right of Privacy: Limitations on State Action after 
Danforth and Carey, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1216, 1227-33 (1977). 
163. The court in People v.  Doe hinted that the privilege should be allowable only if 
all the family members participated in claiming the privilege. 61 A.D.2d a t  435 n.9, 403 
N.Y.S.2d at  381 n.9. 
These proposed exceptions to a parent-child privilege are not the only exceptions a 
court or legislature may wish to consider. One notable example might be the distinction 
between "acts and facts." Since the basic impetus of most privileges derives from the 
belief that persons involved in certain relationships should be free from apprehension of 
disclosure, the protection of the privilege in many jurisdictions extends only to communi- 
cations or communicative acts but not to noncommunicative acts. If the act is not in- 
tended to communicate then the apprehension of disclosure that the privilege is designed 
to guard against would not be alleviated by protecting any information obtained, and 
disclosure may be compelled. MCCORMICK, supra note 8, 4 79 (husband-wife privilege); 8 
WIGMORE, supra note 12, !j 2306 (attorney-client privilege). Although the majority rule is 
probably to the contrary, MCCORMICK, supra note 8, 4 79, a t  164; 35 CORNELL .Q. 187, 
188-89 (1949), there is a substantial minority to the effect that the viewing of noncommun- 
icative acts is not a privileged matter. MCCORMICK, supra note 8, 4 79, a t  164. While 
protection of parent-child communications or acts intended to communicate are essential 
to keep the lines of communication open, the protection of viewing noncommwnicative 
acts may not be. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
With the exception of the husband-wife relationship, it sim- 
ply cannot be argued that the relationships now protected by the 
panoply of privilege are more important to society (and the indi- 
viduals involved) than the parent-child relationship. It is an an- 
omoly that a purely clinical relationship such as the physician- 
patient relationship seemingly commands more respect in the 
legal world than does the fundamental relationship of parent and 
child. There is nothing more deeply rooted in our history and 
tradition, and indeed in our Constitution, than the sanctity of the 
family.Is4 While the importance of the state interest in fact accu- 
mulation cannot be ignored, it should not be exalted to a relative 
importance it does not possess. 
Neither of the competing state or familial interests is an 
absolute. Striking a balance between these two interests may be 
accomplished, as it has in the contexts of other relational privi- 
leges, by recognizing the privilege but allowing for exceptions in 
appropriate circumstances. While the list of possible exceptions 
catalogued here is not exhaustive, it does form a starting point 
for serious consideration of the conflict between parent-child 
communicative privacy and the demands of effective law enforce- 
ment. 
Bruce Neal Lemons 
- - 
Although the relational privileges generally protect communications that reveal past 
illegal conduct, they do not protect attempts to utilize them to protect a present fraud or 
other illegal conduct. MCCORMICK, supra note 8, 4 95 (attorney-client); ~o&sel l& Crippin, 
Evidentiary Privileges, 40 MINN. L. REV. 413, 421 (1956); Husband- Wife Privileges, supra 
note 29, at 227-28 & n.108 (husband-wife). Privileges generally may be asserted only to 
foster a relationship-allowing the parent and child to commit fraud via the privilege 
simply has no beneficial effect on the relationship and should not be allowed. 
Some privileges are limited in their application to civil or criminal matters. Disclo- 
sures of confidential communications in civil cases where the child would not be the 
subject of criminal investigation would arguably not have as great an impact on the 
parent-child relation and should be allowed. 
Another matter meriting serious attention would be the conditions upon which the 
privilege would be waived. Since a constitutional right is involved, the waiver would 
probably have to be a knowing one. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
164. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977). 
